this action at this late juncture. Plaintiff seeks to hold Acosta and the State of 2 California liable for prosecuting plaintiff in August 2010. The Court recognizes it "should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "This 3 strong policy toward permitting the amendment of pleadings, however, must be 4 5 tempered with considerations of 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the 6 part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 7 allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 8 amendment, futility of amendment, etc." Schlachter-Jones v. Gen. Tel. of Cal., 936 9 F.2d 435, 443 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 10 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)), overruled on other grounds by Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 11 Here, plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in requesting leave to amend. The 12 13 Court's December 19, 2013 Case Management and Scheduling Order set an April 14 21, 2014 deadline for plaintiff to seek leave to substitute specifically named 15 individuals in place of the Doe defendants named in plaintiff's strip search claim. Plaintiff did not seek such leave by the deadline, and she offers no compelling 16 17 justification for now seeking to add as defendants a person and government entity long known to her after there has already been a recommended ruling on the fully-18 briefed summary judgment motion. See id. ("The timing of the motion, after the 19 20 parties had conducted discovery and a pending summary judgment motion had been 21 fully briefed, weighs heavily against allowing leave. A motion for leave to amend is 22 not a vehicle to circumvent summary judgment."). 23 Further, the amendment plaintiff seeks would be futile. Plaintiff's proposed 24 claims against Deputy District Attorney Acosta in her individual capacity for 25 charging decisions she made would be barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. 26 See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-44, 129 S. Ct. 855, 172 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2009); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 27

128 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity applies to conduct "intimately associated with

28

the judicial phase of the criminal process," protecting prosecutors when performing 2 traditional activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal 3 prosecutions); Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2005) (prosecutorial immunity applies to the decision to prosecute a particular case). And plaintiff's 4 5 claims against the State of California and against Acosta in her official capacity 6 would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 7 159, 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (an "official-capacity suit is, in 8 all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity"); *Pennhurst* 9 State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (in absence of consent suit against a State or one of its agencies is 10 11 proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment); Weiner v. San Diego Cnty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (California district attorneys act as state officials when deciding 12 13 whether to prosecute an individual). Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff's 14 Motion for leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint. 15 In addition, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which plaintiff has objected. The Court accepts the findings and 16 17 recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as set forth in the Final Report and 18 Recommendation. 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: (1) plaintiff's Motion for leave to amend (docket no. 237) is denied; (2) defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 20 21 (docket no. 224) is granted; and (3) Judgment will be entered dismissing this action 22 with prejudice. an Klaus 23 24 DATED: _10/27/15___ 25 HONORABLE R. GARY KLAUSNER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27

28